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The building block of today’s world are not materials, but, computers and algorithms 
with communication networks between physical entities. A cyber physical system (CPS) 
is a system in which the cyber and physical entities of the system work together towards a 
common goal, for example a water treatment facility or an electricity distribution system. 
These cyber physical infrastructures affect day to day lives of people and hence become 
target point for the attackers to disrupt normal daily life. Owing to the complexity of a 
cyber physical system, the attacks have themselves become sophisticated and harder to 
detect. These sophisticated attacks no longer attempt to steal information, however, intend 
to corrupt it inside the system in order to affect the normal functioning of the system.
To identify such attacks in a CPS, this thesis uses the multiple security domain 
non-deducibility model. The MSDND model divides the system into security domains 
and reduces the notion of trust into the system by replacing it with invariant based 
valuation functions. This work concentrates on the Future Renewable Electric Energy 
Distribution Management System (FREEDM) as a smart grid infrastructure. This thesis 
will attempt to identify potential ways in which smart grid infrastructure FREEDM can 
be attacked and suggest measures to identify the attacker using the MSDND model. 
While doing so this thesis concentrates on building blocks of the FREEDM system i.e. 
the state collection protocol and its distributed nature.
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xNOMENCLATURE
Symbols
⊕ Exclusive OR (xor)
Device Set of devices in FREEDM system
DS Set of device signals in FREEDM system
Sx A boolean state variable, x is true or false
W Set of all possible worlds
w A world of interest
Biφ Modal BELIEF operator
Ii, jφ Modal INFORMATION TRANSFER operator
SDi Security domain of entity i
Ti, jφ Modal TRUST operator
vx
i (φ) Valuation function of boolean x in domain i
Acronyms
CPS Cyber Physical System
DESD Distributed Energy Storage Device
DGI Distributed Grid Intelligence
DRER Distributed Renewable Energy Resource
xi
FID Fault Isolation Device
FREEDM Future Renewable Electric Energy Delivery and Management
MM Marker Message
MS Message Passing Module
PE Power Electronics
SST Solid State Transformer
1. INTRODUCTION
A coordination between computers, algorithms, communication networks and un-
derlying physical components forms the core concept of a CPS. A wide variety of attacks
are possible on all the CPS by affecting any of the above components of the system. An
important point to observe here is that this work does not talk about identity theft or ac-
cess theft, the problem at hand is corrupting the information flow paths among distributed
components of a CPS to affect normal operations of a system. This work considers the
FREEDM system as our cyber physical infrastructure. The FREEDM smart grid is a pro-
posed energy internet or electric power distribution system that is suitable for plug and play
of distributed energy resources and energy storage devices (Huang et al., 2011). A smart
grid is susceptible to different types of attacks such as data integrity attacks (Duan and
Chow, 2017) and fake supply attacks (Roth and McMillin, 2013). These attacks have been
demonstrated over the FREEDM system and the paper proposes a common approach based
over the MSDND framework and belief, information transfer and trust(BIT) logic, (Howser
and McMillin, 2014) to identify the malicious nodes in the system. The power distribution
and consumption system is heavily dependent over three modules in the FREEDM system:
Group Management, state collection protocol and energy management protocol. The task
of the state collection protocol is to collect states of all the devices in the energy internet
(Crow et al., 2010). A malicious node (distributed renewable energy device(DRER) / dis-
tributed energy storage device(DESD) / solid state transformer (SST)) can lie about its state
to the distributed grid intelligence (DGI) corrupting all the power computations of the DGI
which may result into a potential blackout for the sub-grid or issues such as power migration
contacts not being fulfilled.
22. LITERATURE REVIEW
In a CPS attacks that corrupt the information flow are difficult to identify as the
attacker becomes part of the system and is not an external entity aiming for theft of
information. This thesis also discusses, solutions proposed to identify failed components
(specifically a component that sends conflicting or false messages to peer components) in a
distributed system.
2.1. MODAL LOGIC
The modal logic (Liau, 2003) (Liau, 2005) or belief, information acquisition, and
trust(BIT) logic is a well formulated method to analyse information flow between two
entities. BIT logic is important to determine security for a cyber physical system, as it
helps us to determine belief and trust as a logic rather than a propositional boolean entity.
It also helps us to represent a formal definition of MSDND in the form of modal logic.
Sutherland’s Nondeducibility (Sutherland, 1986), BIT logic (Liau, 2003) and MSDND
(Howser and McMillin, 2013) are the three main pillars of this work.
2.2. MSDND
In order to analyse complex cyber physical systems multiple security domain non
deducibility is introduced by (Howser and McMillin, 2013). MSDND is based on modal
logic where in a complex infrastructure is divided into multiple security domains as com-
pared to two in Sutherlands’ Nondeducibility model (Sutherland, 1986). A security domain
is a partition or world which may overlap / coincide with other partitions or worlds. An
action invisible outside its security domain is said to be MSDND secure. For an action
3or event to be visible outside its security domain a valuation function vyx (φ) is defined.
A valuation function viy is a boolean function which outputs true if the value of entity of
variable x can be seen from domain y and false otherwise.





w  (@ vix (w) ∧ @ viy (w))
]
2.3. INVARIANTS
A property or characteristic of system that remains unaffected or can be evaluated to
determine specify system semantics or functioning can be termed as an invariant. (Owicki
and Gries, 1976) proposed an axiomatic basis for the truth of invariants on cyber systems.
Recent developments show the use of invariants in physical power systems (Paul et al.,
2014) and water treatment systems (Adepu and Mathur, 2016).
2.4. UNDERSTANDING MSDND AND HOW A PROOF IS CONSTRUCTED
This section aims at giving a high level view of MSDND and how MSDND proofs
are constructed. MSDNDmodel has two important components, 1. Dividing the underlying
infrastructure into security domains and 2. Capturing information flow paths within these
security domains. To understand this better, consider architecture in Figure 2.1
The Figure 2.1 captures two individuals sitting in a room divided through a wall.
Alice and Bob can only communicate through the communication channel. The wall does
not allow alice or bob to see each other or pass messages without using the communication
channel. As there is only one information flow path between alice and bob, Table 2.1






Figure 2.1. Basic MSDND
Table 2.1. Security Domains - Understanding MSDND
Security Domain System Entity
SDAlice Alice’s domain
SDBob Bob’s domain
Considering the system architecture in the Figure 2.1, imagine below line of ques-
tions:
Alice: Bob, are you working on the thesis?
Bob: Yes Alice, of-course I am.
Alice: Amazing, i am also working on the thesis.
In the above conversation, there is no way in which both Alice or Bob can verify
if the other was speaking the truth. They have to trust the responses from each other. In
such a case MSDND says that there is no valuation function that exists in either domains
which can verify the truth or the system is MSDND secure. As discussed above MSDND
secure system is good for the attacker and bad for the system. MSDND captures validity of
working over thesis by Alice and Bob as represented as below:
5MSDND(ES) = ∃w 3 W ` [(Sthesis ⊕ S∼thesis)]∧[
w  (@ vAlicethesis (w) ∧ @ vAlice∼thesis (w))
]
MSDND(ES) = ∃w 3 W ` [(Sthesis ⊕ S∼thesis)]∧[
w  (@ vBobthesis (w) ∧ @ vBob∼thesis (w))
]
An intuitive way to make this system deducible is to introduce a window in the wall
between Alice and Bob. This window will allow both Alice and Bob to see through the wall
and hence verify the validity or truth of the responses, there by giving a valuation function
to both of them. As the window is based over the system properties and cannot be masked
or falsified, it is called as an invariant. Once the system becomes deducible and one domain
can verify other, MSDND is represented as below:
MSDND(ES) , ∃w 3 W ` [(Sthesis ⊕ S∼thesis)]∧[
w  (∃ vAlicethesis (w) ∧ ∃ vAlice∼thesis (w))
]
MSDND(ES) , ∃w 3 W ` [(Sthesis ⊕ S∼thesis)]∧[
w  (∃ vBobthesis (w) ∧ ∃ vBob∼thesis (w))
]
2.5. THE FREEDM SYSTEM
The future renewable electric energy management system (Crow et al., 2010) is a
highly distributed system, intended to serve as collection of distributed energy generation
and storage devices alongwith existing power infrastructure. A general purpose architecture
of FREEDM system is shown in Figure 2.2:
2.5.1. DGI. The distributed grid intelligence or DGI is the software component or
brain behind controlling the FREEDMsystem. TheDGI is responsible to implement various
energy management algorithms and implement decisions such as the power migration
contracts.
6Figure 2.2. The FREEDM system architecture
• Power Migration Contracts A Power migration contract is an atomic set of instructions
among the supply (with excess power availability) and demand (in need for more power)
node that helps to buy and sell power. Power migration in the FREEDM system happens
through a power migration contract. A power migration contract comprises of below
steps:
– 1. Supply house advertises excess generation.
– 2. Demand house requests power from supply house.
– 3. Supply and demand house start a migration.
– 4a. Supply house increases its local generation.
– 4b. Demand house increases its local load.
A power migration contract is considered successful if all of the above steps are executed
as stated.
72.5.2. IEM. The intelligent energy management (IEM) comprises both hardware
as well as the software components. The component being referred to here is a solid state
transformer (SST). A SST behaves essentially as an energy router, facilitating exchange of
power to and from the grid and individual house nodes.
2.5.3. IFM. The intelligent fault management (IFM) comes into play to handle
known unknowns in the FREEDM system. It refers to the ability to handle and recover
from unlikely situations of power disruptions.
2.6. ENERGY INTERNET
The distributed nature of the FREEDM system has SST and DGI as its core.The
cyber components of the grid are heavily dependent on two algorithms the state collection
protocol (Chandy and Lamport, 1985) and the energy management algorithm. The task
of state collection protocol is to keep the DGI updated of current status of all the power
devices managed by the it. The communication happens with a status message. The status
message packet contains the device type along with a floating point value which represents
status of the device. This work does not concentrate on stealing any information flowing
in the system, rather, concentrates on corrupting the information in a way where in the
cyber components of cyber physical system are unaware of the issues in the system. This
work uses a STUXNET-like (Howser and McMillin, 2014) virus to corrupt the information
flowing through statusmessages and demonstrate howMSDNDcan be helpful to detect such
attacks. Similar attacks are possible on the distributed nature of the FREEDMsystem, where
in message flow inside the system through different protocols can be corrupted to disrupt
the normal functioning of the system. This work makes use of MSDND and formulates
invariant dependent on the physical properties of the system (Roth and McMillin, 2013) to
help us detect such attacks in the FREEDM system.
82.7. THE BYZANTINE GENERALS PROBLEM
The Byzantine Generals Problem (Lamport et al., 1982) provides solution to a
scenario when a failed component of the distributed system tries to mislead the system
semantics by sending conflicting messages to its peers. These conflicting messages can lead
to decisions causing system failures in many scenarios. (Lamport et al., 1982) proposes a
solution based on message communication which can prevent such failures that can also be
implemented in the FREEDM system.
2.8. PHYSICAL ATTESTATION OF CYBER PROCESSES IN A SMART GRID
The physical attestation protocol proposed by (Roth and McMillin, 2013) is a dis-
tributed algorithm based on the physical properties of the system to validate the cyber
process truth. The protocol is a general purpose solution for smart grids to validate the
cyber component behaviour using the physical properties of the system. Physical attesta-
tion of the cyber process primarily helps in identifying the fake power injection attacks. To
understand physical attestation, we have to first understand the system below:
Conservation of energy. To determine if reported readings by a node are true or
false law of conservation of energy can be used. Law of conservation of energy can provide
us with an invariant based over physical properties of the system. An invariant is based over
the physical properties of the system and cannot be falsified by the cyber components in a
cyber physical system.
To understand the invariant based over the law of conservation of energy, please
consider the Figure 2.3
The law of conservation of energy states that at points a, b and c or the point of
common coupling the total energy entering the point should be equal to the total energy










Figure 2.3. 3 Node System Depicting Power Flows
Ia : Pin + P1 − Pab = 0
Ib : Pab + P2 − Pbc = 0
Ic : Pbc + P3 − Pout = 0
The above three equations originate from the physical properties of the system and
cannot be falsified or masked. In the Figure 2.3 let us consider node 2 being the target
of physical attestation protocol. To verify the reported value P2 the power values from
adjacent nodes can be used. The below equation can be used to calculate the power values







An intrinsic property of a CPS is its distributed nature. The distributed nature of a
CPS makes it more vulnerable to attacks from attackers who have partial or complete in-
formation of the distributed components. The work demonstrates STUXNET-like (Howser
and McMillin, 2014) attacks on distributed systems working over the FREEDM (Huang
et al., 2011) system as an example model. It uses MSDND and BIT logic to model the
attacks and address the non-deducible nature of these attacks. The STUXNET-like attacks
are an unconventional type of attacks where in, the motive of an attacker is not to steal the
information, however, to corrupt the information inside the system in order to destabilise the
system (Chen, 2010). The behavior of corrupting rather than stealing the information is the
primary reason why such attacks go un-noticed and harm the system. This work considers
a 3 node 3.1 and a 7 node FREEDM system, that are scalable to much larger systems, to
demonstrate an attack scenario. Under the MSDND model, an attack is successful if the
information in one security domain is not visible to another security domain. Such a system
is called MSDND secure. MSDND secure system is not ideal for the system, however, good
for an attacker, as the attack remains hidden inside the security domain and is not visible to
other domains.
Attack Model
The FREEDM system, due to its distributed nature, is heavily dependent on the message
flow among peer nodes. Message or information flow among the peer nodes is taken care by
the state collection protocol. Corrupting this message flow among peer nodes will disrupt
the normal functioning of the system. Let us assume a 3 node system to demonstrate effect
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Figure 3.1. 3 Node FREEDM System architecture
In the system architecture displayed in Figure 3.2, the information path in between
the power electronics module and message passing module is corrupted due to the the
presence of a STUXNET-like virus. To analyze the effect of such an attack this work has
divided the system into various security domains based over the information flow paths.
Table 3.1 shows the security domain partitions and the associated system entity comprised
within it.
The system architecture in Figure 3.2 is a basic architecture, that will demonstrate
some modifications based over the number of nodes in the architecture or the position of

























Figure 3.2. 3 Node FREEDM System affected by the STUXNET-like virus
Table 3.1. Attack Model: Details of Security Domains
Security Domain System Entity
SDPE
1 Power Electronics (Node 1)
SDMS
1 Message Passing Module (Node 1)
SDDGI
1 DGI (Node 1)
SDDGI
2 DGI (Node 2)
SDMS
2 Message Passing Module (Node 2)
SDPE
2 Power Electronics (Node 2)
SDDGI
3 DGI (Node 3)
SDMS
3 Message Passing Module (Node 3)
SDPE
3 Power Electronics (Node 3)
SDSTUX STUXNET-like firus
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4. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDM SYSTEM
4.1. STATE COLLECTION PROTOCOL
The task of state collection protocol is to collect the state of each of the devices in
FREEDM system and update the same to the DGI. A status message has below parameters
or signal types from different devices:
Table 4.1. Devices and signal types






The state collection protocol is based over the distributed snapshot algorithm from
Chandy Lamport (Chandy and Lamport, 1985). The protocol works in 2 steps:
1. The initiator node records its own state and broadcasts a marker out to the peers. It
also starts recording the messages from other peers until it receives the marker back.
2. A peer node, upon receiving the marker for the first time, records its own state and
forwards the marker to the next peer. After recording its own state it also records
messages from other peers, until it receives the marker back.
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Based over the two stage process this work will perform a security analysis based
over multiple security domain nondeducibility in the FREEDM system. The thesis targets
the information path available among different devices and analyzes the effect of STUXNET-
like virus over the information flowing over the paths.
4.1.1. MSDND Analysis State Collection Protocol - Step 1.
• DGI - device interaction. DGI Device interaction is when the state collection protocol
takes a local snapshot at the device level. The device here refers to {Device | device ∈
SST, DESD, DRER}. Each device has a status message or status signal as given in Table
4.1 The set of device signals is given as {DS | DS ∈ gateway, storage, generation}
Theorem 4.1.1.1. Under normal conditions device signal status message from a device to
DGI is not MSDND secure
Proof: Under normal conditions status message received by DGI from the devices is
correct and the normal functioning of the system is not affected. The depiction of security
domains is as shown in Figure 4.1
Information Flow Path:
– Power electronics sends the device signal to message passing module
– Message passing module sends device signal values to DGI




– DS = True; device signal status message exchange is normal
– IMS,PE (DS); PE reports device signal value to Message passing module
– BMS IMS,PE (DS);MS module believes report from PE




















Figure 4.1. DGI device interaction
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– BMS IMS,PE (DS) ∧ TMS,PE (DS) → BMS (DS);MS believes the reading
– IDGI,MS (DS);MS reports device signal value to DGI
– BDGI IDGI,MS (DS); DGI believes report from MS
– TDGI,MS (DS); DGI module trusts the report from MS
– BDGI IDGI,MS (DS) ∧ TDGI,MS (DS) → BDGI (DS); DGI believes the reading
– w  vDGIDS = True; There exists valuation function in security domain for DGI
MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SDS ⊕ S∼DS)] ∧
[
w  (∃ vDGIDS (w) ∧ ∃ vDGI∼DS (w))
]
Theorem4.1.1.2. DGIdevice communication isMSDNDsecure in presence of STUXNET-
like virus
Proof: Under STUXNET-like virus attack, status message received by DGI from the
device is falsified and the normal functioning of the system is affected. The depiction of
security domains is as shown in Figure 4.2
Information Flow Path:
– Power electronics sends the device signal value to STUXNET-like virus
– STUXNET-like virus sends device signal values to Message passing module
– Message passing module sends device signal values to DGI
– ∼ DS = True; Device signal status message exchange is not normal
– w  VDGIDS = False; No valuation function in DGI security domain for storage
values
– ISTUX,PE (∼ DS); PE reports device signal value to STUXNET-like virus
– BSTUX ISTUX,PE (∼ DS); STUXNET-like virus believes report from PE

















Figure 4.2. DGI device interaction under virus attack
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– BSTUX ISTUX,PE (∼ DS)∧TSTUX,PE (∼ DS) → BSTUX (∼ DS); STUXNET-like virus
believes the reading
– IMS,STUX (DS); STUXNET-like virus reports modified device signal value to MS
– BMS IMS,STUX (DS);MS module believes report from STUXNET-like virus
– TMS,STUX (DS);MS module trusts the report from STUXNET-like virus
– BMS IMS,STUX (DS)∧TMS,STUX (DS) → BMS (DS);MSmodule believes the reading
– IDGI,MS (DS);MS reports device signal value to DGI
– BDGI IDGI,MS (DS); DGI believes report from MS
– TDGI,MS (DS); DGI module trusts the report from MS
– BDGI IDGI,MS (DS) ∧ TDGI,MS (DS) → BDGI (DS); DGI believes the reading
– w  vDGIDS = False; No valuation function exists in security domain for DGI
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SDS ⊕ S∼DS)] ∧
[
w  (@ vDGIDS (w) ∧ @ vDGI∼DS (w))
]
4.1.2. MSDND Analysis State Collection protocol - Step 2. State collection pro-
tocol, in its first step asks a DGI node to collect a local snapshot of the system state and
send a marker to all its peer nodes. Once the marker is sent, the DGI listens to all the
communication from peer nodes until it receives the marker back. This marks the second
step of the state collection protocol. The protocol targets all the different device types and
status message types associated with them. This work considers each of the device types
and messages below in detail.
• DGI - DGI Interaction Device types in the FREEDM system report their signal status
value to DGI. The details of device types and their associated signal values are given in
Table 4.1. The status signal message is shared with the DGI which in turn shares it with




















1N N 2 NShared
Figure 4.3. DGI DGI interaction under normal operations
Theorem 4.1.2.1. Under normal conditions the state collection protocol communication
between two DGI nodes is not MSDND secure
Proof: Under normal conditions status message received by peer nodes from any other
node is correct and the normal functioning of the system is not affected. The depiction
of security domains is as shown in Figure 4.3
Information Flow Path:
– Node 1 Power electronics sends the device signal value to node 1 message passing
module
– Node 1 message passing module sends device signal values to node 1 DGI
– Node 1 DGI sends the status message to Node 2 DGI and Node 3 DGI
20


























– DS = True; Device signal status message exchange is normal
– IMS1,PE1 (DS); Node 1 PE reports device signal value to node 1 message passing
module
– BMS1 IMS1,PE1 (DS); Node 1 MS module believes report from node 1 PE
– TMS1,PE1 (DS); Node 1 MS module trusts the report from node 1 PE
– BMS1 IMS1,PE1 (DS) ∧TMS1,PE1 (DS) → BMS1 (DS); Node 1 MS believes the reading
– IDGI1,MS1 (DS); Node 1 MS reports device signal value to node 1 DGI
– BDGI1 IDGI1,MS1 (DS); Node 1 DGI believes report from node 1 MS
– TDGI1,MS1 (DS); node 1 DGI module trusts the report from MS
– BDGI1 IDGI1,MS1 (DS) ∧ TDGI1,MS1 (DS) → BDGI1 (DS); Node 1 DGI believes the
reading
– IDGI2,DGI1 (DS); Node 1 DGI reports device signal value to node 2 DGI
– BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (DS); node 2 DGI believes report from node 1 DGI
– TDGI2,DGI1 (DS); node 2 DGI module trusts the report from node 1 DGI
– BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (DS) ∧ TDGI2,DGI1 (DS) → BDGI2 (DS); Node 2 DGI believes the
reading
– IDGI3,DGI1 (DS); Node 1 DGI reports device signal value to node 3 DGI
– BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI1 (DS); node 3 DGI believes report from node 1 DGI
– TDGI3,DGI1 (DS); node 3 DGI module trusts the report from node 1 DGI
– BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI1 (DS) ∧ TDGI3,DGI1 (DS) → BDGI3 (DS); Node 3 DGI believes the
reading
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– w  vDGI2DS = True; There exists valuation function in security domain for node 2
DGI
– w  vDGI3DS = True; There exists valuation function in security domain for node 3
DGI
MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SDS ⊕ S∼DS)] ∧
[




MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SDS ⊕ S∼DS)] ∧
[




Theorem 4.1.2.2. State collection communication between two DGI nodes is MSDND
secure in presence of STUXNET-like virus
Proof: Under STUXNET-like virus attack, status message exchange between two DGI
nodes is not normal and the functioning of the system is affected. The depiction of
security domains is as shown in Figure 4.4
Information Flow Path:
– Node 1 power electronics sends the device signal value to STUXNET-like virus
– STUXNET-like virus sends device signal values to node 1 message passing module
– Node 1 message passing module sends device signal values to node 1 DGI
– Node 1 DGI sends device signal values to node 2 DGI and node 3 DGI
– ∼ DS = True; Device signal status message exchange is not normal
– w  VDGI2DS = False; No valuation function in security domain for node 2 DGI
– ISTUX,PE1 (∼ DS);Node 1PE reports device signal statusmessage value to STUXNET-
like virus
– BSTUX ISTUX,PE1 (∼ DS); STUXNET-like virus believes report from node 1 PE
– TSTUX,PE1 (∼ DS); STUXNET-like virus trusts the report from node 1 PE
– BSTUX ISTUX,PE1 (∼ DS) ∧ TSTUX,PE1 (∼ DS) → BSTUX (∼ DS); STUXNET-like

























Figure 4.4. DGI DGI interaction under STUXNET-like virus attack
– IMS1,STUX (stor); STUXNET-like virus reports modified device signal value to node
1 MS
– BMS1 IMS1,STUX (DS);Node 1MSmodule believes report fromSTUXNET-like virus.
– TMS1,STUX (DS); Node 1 MS module trusts the report from STUXNET-like virus
– BMS1 IMS1,STUX (DS) ∧TMS1,STUX (DS) → BMS1 (DS); Node 1 MS module believes
the reading
– IDGI1,MS1 (DS); Node 1 MS reports device signal value to node 1 DGI
– BDGI1 IDGI1,MS1 (DS); Node 1 DGI believes report from node 1 MS
– TDGI1,MS1 (DS); Node 1 DGI module trusts the report from node 1 MS
– BDGI1 IDGI1,MS1 (MS) ∧ TDGI1,MS1 (DS) → BDGI1 (DS); Node 1 DGI believes the
reading
– IDGI2,DGI1 (DS); Node 1 DGI reports device signal value to node 2 DGI
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– BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (DS); node 2 DGI believes report from node 1 DGI
– TDGI2,DGI1 (DS); node 2 DGI module trusts the report from node 1 DGI
– BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (DS) ∧ TDGI2,DGI1 (DS) → BDGI2 (DS); Node 2 DGI believes the
reading
– IDGI3,DGI2 (DS); Node 1 DGI reports device signal value to node 3 DGI
– BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI2 (DS); node 3 DGI believes report from node 1 DGI
– TDGI3,DGI2 (DS); node 3 DGI module trusts the report from node 1 DGI
– BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI2 (DS) ∧ TDGI3,DGI2 (DS) → BDGI3 (DS); Node 3 DGI believes the
reading
– w  vDGI2DS = False; No valuation function exists in security domain for Node 2
DGI
– w  vDGI3DS = False; No valuation function exists in security domain for Node 3
DGI
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SDS ⊕ S∼DS)] ∧
[
w  (@ vDGI
2




MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SDS ⊕ S∼DS)] ∧
[
w  (@ vDGI
3




Theorem 4.1.2.3. State collection marker message communication between two DGI
nodes is MSDND secure in presence of STUXNET-like virus
Proof: Under STUXNET-like virus attack on the DGI, the marker message exchange
between two DGI nodes is not normal and the functioning of the system is affected. It is
worth noting here that the impact of such an attack will be concentrated to the affected
DGI and its peer nodes. Marker message here is represented as MM
Case a. Considering node 1 as the initiator of state collection protocol as well as the




























Figure 4.5. Initiator node marker message communication under STUXNET-like virus
attack
– Node 1 is the initiator of state collection, and initiates a local system snapshot
– Node 1 power electronics sends the device signal value to node 1 message passing
virus
– Node 1 message passing module sends the device signal value to node 1 DGI virus
– Node 1 DGI sends the device signal value to stuxnet-like virus
– STUXNET-like virus receives the local parameters, however does not send a marker
to peer nodes to collect global states.
– DS = True; Device signal status message exchange is not normal
– w  VDGI1DS = True;Valuation function exists in security domain for node 1 DGI
– IMS1,PE1 (DS); Node 1 PE reports device signal status message value to node 1
message passing module
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– BMS1 IMS1,PE1 (DS); Node 1 message passing module believes report from node 1
PE
– TMS1,PE1 (DS); Node 1 message passing module trusts the report from node 1 PE
– BMS1 IMS1,PE1 (DS)∧TMS1,PE1 (DS) → BMS1 (DS);Node 1 message passing module
believes the reading
– IDGI1,MS1 (DS); Node 1 MS reports device signal value to node 1 DGI
– BDGI1 IDGI1,MS1 (DS); Node 1 DGI believes report from node 1 MS
– TDGI1,MS1 (DS); Node 1 DGI module trusts the report from node 1 MS
– BDGI1 IDGI1,MS1 (MS) ∧ TDGI1,MS1 (DS) → BDGI1 (DS); Node 1 DGI believes the
reading
– Step 2 of the state collection protocol is initiated, i.e., sending the marker node to
peer nodes for global state collection.
– The STUXNET-like virus observes this request and stops the global state collection
by not forwarding the marker message to peer nodes.
– Since node N1 is the initiator node for state collection protocol and no marker
message is sent to peer nodes, step 2 of the state collection protocol does not take
place.
– Peer nodes are not aware of the existence of node N1
– w  vDGI1DS = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for Node 1 DGI
– w  vDGI2DS = False; No valuation function exists in security domain for Node 2
DGI
– w  vDGI3DS = False; No valuation function exists in security domain for Node 3
DGI
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SDS ⊕ S∼DS)] ∧
[
w  (@ vDGI
2




MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SDS ⊕ S∼DS)] ∧
[
w  (@ vDGI
3
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Figure 4.6. Peer node marker message communication under STUXNET-like virus attack
Case b. Considering node N1 as the initiator of state collection protocol and Node N2 as
the malicious node The depiction of security domains is as shown in Figure 4.6
Information Flow Path:
– Node 1 is the initiator of state collection, and initiates a local system snapshot
– Node 1 power electronics sends the device signal value to node 1 message passing
virus
– Node 1 message passing module sends the device signal value to node 1 DGI virus
– Node 1 DGI sends the device signal value and marker message to its peer nodes
– The STUXNET-like virus in node 2 receives the parameters and marker message,
however chooses not to send a marker to peer nodes to collect global states and
returns the marker back to Node 1 DGI.
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– DS = True; Device signal status message exchange is normal
– w  VDGI1DS = True;Valuation function exists in security domain for node 1 DGI
– IMS1,PE1 (DS); Node 1 PE reports device signal status message value to node 1
message passing module
– BMS1 IMS1,PE1 (DS); Node 1 message passing module believes report from node 1
PE
– TMS1,PE1 (DS); Node 1 message passing module trusts the report from node 1 PE
– BMS1 IMS1,PE1 (DS)∧TMS1,PE1 (DS) → BMS1 (DS);Node 1 message passing module
believes the reading
– IDGI1,MS1 (DS); Node 1 MS reports device signal value to node 1 DGI
– BDGI1 IDGI1,MS1 (DS); Node 1 DGI believes report from node 1 MS
– TDGI1,MS1 (DS); Node 1 DGI module trusts the report from node 1 MS
– BDGI1 IDGI1,MS1 (MS) ∧ TDGI1,MS1 (DS) → BDGI1 (DS); Node 1 DGI believes the
reading
– ISTUX,DGI1 (DS); Node 1 DGI reports device signal value to STUXNET-like virus
– BSTUX ISTUX,DGI1 (DS); SYUXNET-like virus believes report from node 1 DGI
– TSTUX,DGI1 (DS); STUXNET-like virus trusts the report from node 1 DGI
– BSTUX ISTUX,DGI1 (DS) ∧ TSTUX,DGI1 (DS) → BSTUX (DS); STUXNET-like virus
believes the reading
– ISTUX,DGI1 (MM); Node 1 DGI reports marker message to STUXNET-like virus
– BSTUX ISTUX,DGI1 (MM); SYUXNET-like virus believes report from node 1 DGI
– TSTUX,DGI1 (MM); STUXNET-like virus trusts the report from node 1 DGI
– BSTUX ISTUX,DGI1 (MM)∧TSTUX,DGI1 (MM) → BSTUX (MM);STUXNET-like virus
believes the reading and receives the marker message from node 1 DGI
– The STUXNET-like virus observes this request and stops the global state collection
by not forwarding the marker message to peer nodes.
– Node N1 is the initiator node for state collection protocol and receives the marker
message back from node N2
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– The marker message received from node N2 marks the completion of global state
collection for node N1
– Node N1 is not aware of the global state, which could lead to inconsistency in the
system.
– w  vDGI1DS = False; No valuation function exists in security domain for Node 1
DGI
– w  vDGI3DS = False; No valuation function exists in security domain for Node 3
DGI
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SDS ⊕ S∼DS)] ∧
[
w  (@ vDGI
1




MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SMM ⊕ S∼MM )] ∧
[
w  (@ vDGI
1




MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SDS ⊕ S∼DS)] ∧
[
w  (@ vDGI
3




MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SMM ⊕ S∼MM )] ∧
[
w  (@ vDGI
3




4.2. INTRODUCING DEDUCIBILITY IN CONSENSUS BASED STATE COLLEC-
TION PROTOCOL USING BYZANTINE AGREEMENT
In the previous sections thiswork demonstrated differentways inwhich the FREEDM
system is exposed to STUXNET-like attacks making the system as MSDND secure. For a
cyber physical system such as the FREEDM system an MSDND secure system is good for
an attacker. In further sections this work will try to break the MSDND secure information
flow paths with the help of Byzantine agreement. Our motive is to use the cyber properties
of the system in order to verify the information flowing through the paths, thus, changing
the state of system from MSDND secure to not MSDND secure.
• Modelling Byzantine Agreement Problem as Part of the FREEDM System
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Byzantine agreement problem is the classic representation of a distributed system inwhich
one or more components lie about their states to all the other components. This may lead
to incorrect decisions or system instability due to incorrect information flowing among
the system. As for the FREEDM system, one or more nodes can lie about their local
states to the global state collection, hence a possibility of system instability or incorrect
decisions.
An important condition based over the solution to the Byzantine agreement problem by
Leslie Lamport (Lamport et al., 1982) is the relation between total number of nodes and
faulty nodes in the system. The relation is given as below:
n > 3m
Where, n = total number of nodes and m = faulty nodes in the system. From the above
relation we have below:
m (faulty nodes) relation nodes
0 n > 3(0) NA
1 n > 3(1) 4
2 n > 3(2) 7
Therefore, with one faulty node, a minimum of 4 nodes in the FREEDM system is
required. Expanding upon the condition this work analyzes the state collection protocol
for a 4 node FREEDM system. For the state collection protocol an initiator node initiates
the protocol. A depiction of the 4 node system is shown in Figure 4.7
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Figure 4.8. Message flow in a 4 node system
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The message flow in consensus based state collection protocol is such that all the nodes
can read messages from all the other nodes, hence, forming a completely connected graph
as in Figure 4.8:
































Figure 4.9. Device signal status message flow in a 4 node system
The above shows that each node will send its device signal value to every other node. A
parallel execution of consensus based state collection protocol will take place at every
node. Owing to a basic constraint given by the Byzantine Agreement problem n > 3m
where, n is the total number of nodes and m is the number of malicious nodes, this work
assumes node N1 or node 1 is the malicious node.
Thiswork considers node N1 is the initiator of state collection protocol and is themalicious
node in the 4 node system.
Assumptions:
– Only Node N1 is the malicious node
– Node N1 is the initiator of the consensus based state collection protocol
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– Node N1 tries to falsify device signal status message by sending different values to
different nodes (the motive of the Node is to destabilize the system)
– Identity of message sender can be authenticated
Since there is only 1 faulty node there will be m + 1 rounds of message exchange.
Round 0: In this round node N1 shares device signal values to all the other nodes i.e.
nodes N2, N3 and N4. Figure 4.10 diplays the representation of round 0 when Node N1 is










Figure 4.10. Round 0 message exchange
Clearly, in Figure 4.10 Node N1 sends different generation values to nodes N2, N3 and
N4.
Round 1: Now the nodes N2, N3 and N4 will share the messages with each other. Below
are the details:
Sender = N2 Sender = N3 Sender = N4
Dest Msg Dest Msg Dest Msg
N2 {DS1, 12} N2 {DS1, 13} N2 {DS2, 14}
N3 {DS1, 12} N3 {DS1, 13} N3 {DS2, 14}
N4 {DS1, 12} N4 {DS1, 13} N4 {DS2, 14}
From the above message details it can be identified that Node N1 is the malicious node as
it is trying to send different device signal values to different nodes. For example:
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After round 1 the message details with node N2 will be:
{DS1, 12}, {DS1, 13}, {DS2, 14}, {DS1, 1}
Clearly, from the above it can be established either node N1 or node N4 is malicious.
Hence in such a case a legitimate migration contract should restrict participation of node
N1 and node N4. A similar consensus based comparison will take place at node N3 and
node N4. This will improve the formulation of migration contracts among processes that
are not lying about their states to other nodes.
Theorem 4.2.1. The system is not MSDND secure in a 4 node system (Figure 4.11) with
Byzantine consensus formulation when the malicious node tries to share different status
messages to different nodes. Proof: Since the initiator node is malicious node sharing
a different status message to different nodes leads to a failure to comply with interactive
consistency 2, which implies that if the commander or initiator is loyal, every other node
in the system should receive similar status message. Figure 4.12 depicts the BIT logic
flow. The MSDND proof below corroborates the same:
Information Flow Path:
– Node 1 Power electronics sends the device signal value to STUXNET
– STUXNET sends those values to Node 1 Message passing module
– Node 1 Message passing module sends those messages to node 1 DGI
– Node 1 DGI sends message to node 2 DGI, node 3 DGI and node 4 DGI
– Now all nodes except the initiator node 1 send their messages to all the peer nodes
– ∼ DS = True; Device signal status message exchange is not normal
– ISTUX,PE1 (∼ DS); Node 1 PE reports generation value to STUXNET-like virus
– BSTUX ISTUX,PE1 (∼ gen); STUXNET-like virus believes report from Node 1 PE
– TSTUX,PE1 (∼ DS); STUXNET-like virus trusts the report from Node 1 PE
– BSTUX ISTUX,PE1 (∼ DS) ∧ TSTUX,PE1 (∼ DS) → BSTUX (∼ DS); STUXNET-like




























































Figure 4.12. Failed interactive consistency and MSDND - BIT logic view Byzantine
Agreement
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Now the STUXNET-like virus overwrites the true device signal value and sends different
values to different nodes. Without loss of generality the message transfer takes place as
recorded below:
– Node 1 DGI will send DS1 as device signal value to Node 2 DGI
– Node 1 DGI will send DS1 as device signal value to Node 3 DGI
– Node 1 DGI will send DS2 as device signal value to Node 4 DGI
All message transformation or masking is performed by the STUXNET-like virus and the
same is sent to different nodes. The further analysis of MSDND takes place at the DGI
security domains. BIT logic formulation of round 0:
– IDGI2,DGI1 (DS1); Node 1 DGI reports device signal value to Node 2 DGI
– BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (DS1); Node 2 DGI believes report from Node 1 DGI
– TDGI2,DGI1 (DS1); Node 2 DGI trusts the report from Node 1 DGI
– IDGI3,DGI1 (DS1); Node 1 DGI reports device signal value to Node 3 DGI
– BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI1 (DS1); Node 3 DGI believes report from Node 1 DGI
– TDGI3,DGI1 (DS1); Node 3 DGI trusts the report from Node 1 DGI
– IDGI4,DGI1 (DS2); Node 1 DGI reports a different device signal value to Node 4 DGI
– BDGI4 IDGI4,DGI1 (DS2); Node 4 DGI believes report from Node 1 DGI
– TDGI4,DGI1 (DS2); Node 4 DGI trusts the report from Node 1 DGI
BIT logic formulation of round 1:
– IDGI3,DGI2 (DS1); Node 2 DGI reports device signal value to Node 3 DGI that it
received from Node 1 DGI
– BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI2 (DS1); Node 3 DGI believes report from Node 2 DGI
– TDGI3,DGI2 (DS1); Node 3 DGI trusts the report from Node 2 DGI
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– IDGI4,DGI2 (DS1); Node 2 DGI reports device signal value to Node 4 DGI that it
received from Node 1 DGI
– BDGI4 IDGI4,DGI2 (DS1); Node 4 DGI believes report from Node 2 DGI
– TDGI4,DGI2 (DS1); Node 4 DGI trusts the report from Node 2 DGI
– IDGI2,DGI3 (DS1); Node 3 DGI reports device signal value to Node 2 DGI that it
received from Node 1 DGI
– BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI3 (DS1); Node 2 DGI believes report from Node 3 DGI
– TDGI2,DGI3 (DS1); Node 2 DGI trusts the report from Node 3 DGI
– IDGI4,DGI3 (DS1); Node 3 DGI reports device signal value to Node 4 DGI that it
received from Node 1 DGI
– BDGI4 IDGI4,DGI3 (DS1); Node 4 DGI believes report from Node 3 DGI
– TDGI4,DGI3 (DS1); Node 4 DGI trusts the report from Node 3 DGI
– IDGI2,DGI4 (DS2); Node 4 DGI reports device signal value to Node 2 DGI that it
received from Node 1 DGI
– BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI4 (DS2); Node 2 DGI believes report from Node 4 DGI
– TDGI2,DGI4 (DS2); Node 2 DGI trusts the report from Node 4 DGI
– IDGI3,DGI4 (DS2); Node 4 DGI reports device signal value to Node 3 DGI that it
received from Node 1 DGI
– BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI4 (DS2); Node 3 DGI believes report from Node 4 DGI
– TDGI3,DGI4 (DS2); Node 3 DGI trusts the report from Node 4 DGI
Now combining all the BIT logic formulated until now to force deducibility:
– At Node 2:
[BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI3 (DS1) ∧ TDGI2,DGI3 (DS1)]
∧ [BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI4 (DS2) ∧ TDGI2,DGI4 (DS2)]
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∧ [BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (DS1 ∧ TDGI2,DGI1 (DS1))] →∼ BDGI2 (DS1);Node 2 DGI does
not believe the reading. Clearly either one of node 1 or node 4 are lying about the
device signal values to node 2
– At Node 3:
[BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI1 (DS1) ∧ TDGI3,DGI1 (DS1)]
∧ [BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI2 (DS1) ∧ TDGI3,DGI2 (DS1)]
∧ [BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI4 (DS2) ∧ TDGI3,DGI4 (DS2)] →∼ BDGI3 (DS1);Node 3 DGI does
not believe the reading. Clearly either one of node 1 or node 4 are lying about the
device signal values to node 3
– At Node 4:
[BDGI4 IDGI4,DGI3 (DS2) ∧ TDGI4,DGI1 (DS2)]
∧ [BDGI4 IDGI4,DGI2 (DS1) ∧ TDGI4,DGI2 (DS1)]
∧ [BDGI4 IDGI4,DGI3 (DS1) ∧ TDGI4,DGI3 (DS1)] →∼ BDGI4 (DS2);Node 4 DGI does
not believe the reading. Clearly node 1 is lying about device signal values to different
nodes
– w  vDGI2DS = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for Node 2 DGI
– w  vDGI3DS = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for Node 3 DGI
– w  vDGI4DS = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for Node 4 DGI
MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SDS ⊕ S∼DS)] ∧
[




MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SDS ⊕ S∼DS)] ∧
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MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SDS ⊕ S∼DS)] ∧
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Theorem 4.2.2. The system is MSDND secure in a 4 node system with Byzantine
consensus formulation when the malicious node tries to share similar falsified status
messages to different nodes.
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Proof: Since the initiator node is a malicious node and sophisticated enough to share
similar falsified status message to different nodesinteractive consistency 2 property is
preserved. Figure 4.13 depicts the BIT logic interaction among the nodes. The MSDND
proof below corroborates the same:
Information Flow Path:
– Node 1 Power electronics sends the device signal value to STUXNET
– STUXNET sends those values to Node 1 Message passing module
– Node 1 Message passing module sends those messages to Node 1 DGI
– Node 1 DGI Send message to Node 2 DGI, Node 3 DGI and Node 4 DGI
– Now all nodes except the initiator node 1 send their messages to all the peer nodes
– ∼ DS = True; Device signal status message exchange is not normal
– ISTUX,PE1 (∼ DS); Node 1 PE reports device signal value to STUXNET-like virus
– BSTUX ISTUX,PE1 (∼ DS); STUXNET-like virus believes report from Node 1 PE
– TSTUX,PE1 (∼ DS); STUXNET-like virus trusts the report from Node 1 PE
– BSTUX ISTUX,PE1 (∼ DS) ∧ TSTUX,PE1 (∼ DS) → BSTUX (∼ DS); STUXNET-like
virus believes the reading
Now the STUXNET-like virus overwrites the true device signal values and sends similar
falsified values to different nodes. Further analysis will assumemessage transfer as below:
– Node 1 DGI will send DS1 as device signal value to Node 2 DGI
– Node 1 DGI will send DS1 as device signal value to Node 3 DGI
– Node 1 DGI will send DS1 as device signal value to Node 4 DGI
All message transformation or masking is performed by the STUXNET-like virus and the
same is sent to different nodes. The further analysis of MSDND takes place at the DGI
























Figure 4.13. Interactive consistency and MSDND - BIT logic view Byzantine Agreement
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– IDGI1,DGI1 (DS1); Node 1 DGI reports device signal value to Node 2 DGI
– BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (DS1); Node 2 DGI believes report from Node 1 DGI
– TDGI2,DGI1 (DS1); Node 2 DGI trusts the report from Node 1 DGI
– IDGI3,DGI1 (DS1); Node 1 DGI reports device signal value to Node 3 DGI
– BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI1 (DS1); Node 3 DGI believes report from Node 1 DGI
– TDGI3,DGI1 (DS1); Node 3 DGI trusts the report from Node 1 DGI
– IDGI4,DGI1 (DS1); Node 1 DGI reports device signal value to Node 4 DGI
– BDGI4 IDGI4,DGI1 (DS1); Node 3 DGI believes report from Node 1 DGI
– TDGI4,DGI1 (DS1); Node 3 DGI trusts the report from Node 1 DGI
BIT logic formulation of round 1:
– IDGI3,DGI2 (DS1); Node 2 DGI reports device singal value to Node 3 DGI that it
received from Node 1 DGI
– BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI2 (DS1); Node 3 DGI believes report from Node 2 DGI
– TDGI3,DGI2 (DS1); Node 3 DGI trusts the report from Node 2 DGI
– IDGI4,DGI2 (DS1); Node 2 DGI reports device singal value to Node 4 DGI that it
received from Node 1 DGI
– BDGI4 IDGI4,DGI2 (DS1); Node 4 DGI believes report from Node 2 DGI
– TDGI4,DGI2 (DS1); Node 4 DGI trusts the report from Node 2 DGI
– IDGI2,DGI3 (DS1); Node 3 DGI reports device signal value to Node 2 DGI that it
received from Node 1 DGI
– BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI3 (DS1); Node 2 DGI believes report from Node 3 DGI
– TDGI2,DGI3 (DS1); Node 2 DGI trusts the report from Node 3 DGI
– IDGI4,DGI3 (DS1); Node 3 DGI reports device signal value to Node 4 DGI that it
received from Node 1 DGI
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– BDGI4 IDGI4,DGI3 (DS1); Node 4 DGI believes report from Node 3 DGI
– TDGI4,DGI3 (DS1); Node 4 DGI trusts the report from Node 3 DGI
– IDGI2,DGI4 (DS1); Node 4 DGI reports device signal value to Node 2 DGI that it
received from Node 1 DGI
– BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI4 (DS1); Node 2 DGI believes report from Node 4 DGI
– TDGI2,DGI4 (DS1); Node 2 DGI trusts the report from Node 4 DGI
– IDGI3,DGI4 (DS1); Node 4 DGI reports device signal value to Node 3 DGI that it
received from Node 1 DGI
– BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI4 (DS1); Node 3 DGI believes report from Node 4 DGI
– TDGI3,DGI4 (DS1); Node 3 DGI trusts the report from Node 4 DGI
Now combining all the BIT logic formulated until now to force deducibility:
– At Node 2: [BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI3 (DS1)∧TDGI2,DGI3 (DS1)]∧ [BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI4 (DS1)∧
TDGI2,DGI4 (DS1)]∧[BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (DS1∧TDGI2,DGI1 (DS1))]→ BDGI2 (DS1);Node
2 DGI believes the reading. Clearly, a similar falsified device signal value induces
non deducibility into the system
– At Node 3: [BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI1 (DS1)∧TDGI3,DGI1 (DS1)]∧ [BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI2 (DS1)∧
TDGI3,DGI2 (DS1)]∧[BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI4 (DS1)∧TDGI3,DGI4 (DS1)]→ BDGI3 (DS1);Node
3 DGI believes the reading. Clearly, a similar falsified device signal value induces
non deducibility into the system
– At Node 4: [BDGI4 IDGI4,DGI1 (DS1)∧TDGI4,DGI1 (DS1)]∧ [BDGI4 IDGI4,DGI2 (DS1)∧
TDGI4,DGI2 (DS1)]∧[BDGI4 IDGI4,DGI3 (DS1)∧TDGI4,DGI3 (DS1)]→ BDGI4 (DS1);Node
4 DGI does not believe the reading. Clearly, a similar falsified device signal value
induces non deducibility into the system
– w  vDGI2DS = False; No valuation function exists in security domain for Node 2
DGI
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– w  vDGI3DS = False; No valuation function exists in security domain for Node 3
DGI
– w  vDGI4DS = False; No valuation function exists in security domain for Node 4
DGI
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SDS ⊕ S∼DS)] ∧
[
w  (@ vDGI
2




MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SDS ⊕ S∼DS)] ∧
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w  (@ vDGI
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In the previous section during analysis of state collection protocol this work observed
that an attacker node or malicious node can send similar falsified values to other nodes and
make the system MSDND secure. In such a scenario the Byzantine consensus algorithm
fails to identify the problem and the attacker is able tomake the systemMSDND secure there
by hiding the attack over the system. Moving forward this work will break the MSDND
security in system by using the physical properties of the system. The argument behind using
the physical properties to verify the cyber components is that they cannot be changed. Cyber
components of the system have no control over the physical properties of the system. To
identify such scenarios and narrow down to a definitive number of components responsible
for system malfunction this work uses physical attestation of the cyber process proposed by
(Roth and McMillin, 2013).
4.3.1. Physical Attestation of Cyber Process in a 3 Node FREEDM System.
Physical attestation of the cyber process primarily helps in identifying the fake power
injection attack. It uses the law of conservation of energy to generate invariants based over
the system architecture. The generated invariants are based over physical properties of the
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system and should hold irrespective of the cyber process reporting of status messages. The
basis of a power migration contact is the cyber communication between peer nodes. Owing
to this cyber communication, a malicious node can mask its true parameters and lead to
unpleasant scenarios such as the fake power injection attack.
Assumption: The physical attestation protocol assumes that each node on the smart
grid has the ability to measure voltage and phase angle on the public side of its connection.
This thesis introduces a small change over here. This thesis assumes that the public side of
the connection has smart devices that can report the voltage and phase angle from public
side of connection to the nearest point of common coupling. The point of common coupling
calculates the invariant and sends it to all the nodes in the architecture. This change helps
us to preserve the privacy of the nodes as well as does not give them an undue control over
the public side of the connection, which ideally should remain with the utility. The change
can also be considered as a proposal to the future smart grid infrastructure which will help
increase the resilience and reliability of smart grids.
• MSDND analysis of physical attestation protocol over a 3 node FREEDM system To
verify if the system is MSDND secure in a three node system this work will consider one
node at a time and the parameter values they could falsify to affect the system. Below is





– Considering node 1 as the malicious node This thesis assumes node 1 tries to falsify its



































Figure 4.14. Node 1 acting as malicious node in a 3 Node system
∗ Falsifying P1 will lead to an invariant Ia violation at point of common coupling a.
∗ Falsifying V1 and θ1 will lead to an invariant Ia, Ib violation at point of common
coupling a and b respectively.
∗ Falsifying P1, V1 and θ1 will lead to an invariant Ia violation at points of common
coupling a and b.
Theorem 4.3.1.1. The system is not MSDND secure when Node 1 tries to falsify V1
and θ1
Proof: Let us assume Node 1 tried to falsify V1 and θ1. To represent the corrupt values,
this work will consider P as the entity of exchange.
∗ ∼ P = True; Generation reading reported is not normal
∗ IDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 gets generation values from node 1
∗ BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 believes reading from node 1
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∗ TDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 trusts Node 1
∗ Considering Node 1 tries to falsify V1 and θ1
∗ IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 gets the invariant Ib from SD
Ib
∗ BDGI2 IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 believes the reading from SD
Ib
∗ TDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 trusts the reading from SD
Ib
∗ IDGI2,Ia (Invarianta); Node 2 gets the invariant Ia from SD
Ia
∗ BDGI2 IDGI2,Ia (Invarianta); Node 2 believes the reading from SD
Ia
∗ TDGI2,Ia (Invarianta); Node 2 trusts the reading from SD
Ia
∗ [BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (P) ∧ TDGI2,DGI1 (P)]
∧ [BDGI2 IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb) ∧ TDGI2,Ib (Invariantb)]
∧ [BDGI2 IDGI2,Ia (Invarianta) ∧ TDGI2,Ia (Invarianta)] →∼ BDGI2 (P); Node 2
does not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
∗ w  vDGI2P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 2 DGI
MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[




Theorem 4.3.1.2. The system is MSDND secure when Node 1 tries to falsify P1, V1
and θ1
Proof: Let us assume Node 1 tried to falsify P1, V1 and θ1. To represent the corrupt
values, this work will consider P as the entity of exchange.
∗ ∼ P = True; Generation reading reported is not normal
∗ IDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 gets generation values from node 1
∗ BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 believes reading from node 1
∗ TDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 trusts Node 1
∗ Considering Node 1 tries to falsify P1, V1 and θ1
∗ The invariant Ib = Pab + P2 − Pbc = 0 should be violated and, falsifying P1, V1
and θ1 violates the invariant.
∗ IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 gets the invariant Ib from SD
Ib
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∗ BDGI2 IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 believes the reading from SD
Ib
∗ TDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 trusts the reading from SD
Ib
∗ [BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (P) ∧ TDGI2,DGI1 (P)]
∧ [BDGI2 IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb) ∧ TDGI2,Ib (Invariantb)] →∼ BDGI2 (P); Node 2
does not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
∗ w  vDGI2P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 2 DGI
to identify that generation values reported are corrupt.
∗ w  vDGI2Ni = False; Valuation function does not exist in security domain for node
2 DGI to identify which node reported corrupt generation values.
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[





w  (@ vDGI
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Remark: Here, the above case of invariant violation leads to MSDND secure system.
From the above equation it can be clearly demonstrated that the security domain 4 has
a valuation function to identify if something wrong is going on in the system, however,
it is not possible to identify the origin of the attack. The invariant Ib can be affected
by falsifying either of the P1, V1 and θ1 by node 1 or P2 by node 2. Hence, in a 3 node
system it is impossible to identify which of the two nodes falsified values for invariant
to report the problem in system.
Theorem 4.3.1.3. The system is not MSDND secure when Node 1 tries to falsify P1
Proof: Let us assume Node 1 tried to falsify P1. To represent the corrupt values, this
work will consider P as the entity of exchange.
∗ ∼ P = True; Generation reading reported is not normal
∗ IDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 gets generation values from node 1
∗ BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 believes reading from node 1
∗ TDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 trusts Node 1
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∗ Considering Node 1 tries to falsify P1
∗ The invariant Ia = Pin+P1−Pab = 0 should be violated and, falsifying P1 violates
the invariant.
∗ IDGI2,Ia (Invarianta); Node 2 gets the invariant Ia from SD
Ia
∗ BDGI2 IDGI2,Ia (Invarianta); Node 2 believes the reading from SD
Ia
∗ TDGI2,Ia (Invarianta); Node 2 trusts the reading from SD
Ia
∗ [BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (P) ∧ TDGI2,DGI1 (P)]
∧ [BDGI2 IDGI2,Ia (Invarianta) ∧ TDGI2,Ia (Invarianta)] →∼ BDGI2 (P); Node 2
does not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
∗ w  vDGI2P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 2 DGI
MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[




– Considering node 2 as the malicious node 4.15. This work will assume that node 2
tries to falsify its values and see what all invariants will be violated. A list of impacts
over the invariants is as below:
∗ Falsifying P2 will lead to an invariant Ib violation at point of common coupling b.
∗ Falsifying V2 and θ2 will lead to an invariant Ia, Ib and Ic violation at point of
common coupling a, b and c respectively.
∗ Falsifying P2, V2 and θ2 will lead to invariant Ia and Ic violation at points of
common coupling a and c.
Theorem 4.3.1.4. The system is not MSDND secure when Node 2 tries to falsify V2
and θ2
Proof: Let us assume Node 2 tried to falsify V2 and θ2. To represent the corrupt values,



































Figure 4.15. Node 2 acting as malicious node in a 3 Node system
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∗ ∼ P = True; Generation reading reported is not normal
∗ IDGI1,DGI2 (P); Node 1 gets generation values from node 2
∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,DGI2 (P); Node 1 believes reading from Node 2
∗ TDGI1,DGI2 (P); Node 1 trusts Node 2
∗ IDGI3,DGI2 (P); Node 3 gets generation values from Node 2
∗ BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI2 (P); Node 3 believes reading from Node 2
∗ TDGI3,DGI2 (P); Node 3 trusts Node 2
∗ Considering Node 2 tries to falsify V2 and θ2 all three invariants will be violated
∗ IDGI1,Ib (Invariantb); Node 1 gets the invariant Ib from SD
Ib
∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,Ib (Invariantb); Node 1 believes the reading from SD
Ib
∗ TDGI1,Ib (Invariantb); Node 1 trusts the reading from SD
Ib
∗ IDGI1,Ia (Invarianta); Node 1 gets the invariant Ia from SD
Ia
∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,Ia (Invarianta); Node 1 believes the reading from SD
Ia
∗ TDGI1,Ia (Invarianta); Node 1 trusts the reading from SD
Ia
∗ IDGI1,Ic (Invariantc); Node 1 gets the invariant Ic from SD
Ic
∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,Ic (Invariantc); Node 1 believes the reading from SD
Ic
∗ TDGI1,Ic (Invariantc); Node 1 trusts the reading from SD
Ic
∗ [BDGI1 IDGI1,DGI2 (P) ∧ TDGI1,DGI2 (P)]
∧ [BDGI1 IDGI1,Ia (Invarianta) ∧ TDGI1,Ia (Invarianta)]
∧ [BDGI1 IDGI1,Ib (Invariantb) ∧ TDGI1,Ib (Invariantb)]
∧ [BDGI1 IDGI1,Ic (Invariantc) ∧ TDGI1,Ic (Invariantc)] →∼ BDGI1 (P); Node 1
does not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
∗ w  vDGI1P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 1 DGI
∗ IDGI3,Ib (Invariantb); Node 3 gets the invariant Ib from SD
Ib
∗ BDGI3 IDGI3,Ib (Invariantb); Node 3 believes the reading from SD
Ib
∗ TDGI3,Ib (Invariantb); Node 3 trusts the reading from SD
Ib
∗ IDGI3,Ia (Invarianta); Node 3 gets the invariant Ia from SD
Ia
∗ BDGI3 IDGI3,Ia (Invarianta); Node 3 believes the reading from SD
Ia
∗ TDGI3,Ic (Invarianta); Node 3 trusts the reading from SD
Ia
∗ IDGI3,Ic (Invariantc); Node 3 gets the invariant Ic from SD
Ic
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∗ BDGI3 IDGI3,Ic (Invariantc); Node 3 believes the reading from SD
Ic
∗ TDGI3,Ic (Invariantc); Node 3 trusts the reading from SD
Ic
∗ [BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI2 (P) ∧ TDGI3,DGI2 (P)]
∧ [BDGI3 IDGI3,Ia (Invarianta) ∧ TDGI3,Ia (Invarianta)]
∧ [BDGI3 IDGI3,Ib (Invariantb) ∧ TDGI3,Ib (Invariantb)]
∧ [BDGI3 IDGI3,Ic (Invariantc) ∧ TDGI3,Ic (Invariantc)] →∼ BDGI3 (P); Node 3
does not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
∗ w  vDGI3P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 3 DGI
MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[




MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[




Theorem 4.3.1.5. The system is not MSDND secure when Node 2 tries to falsify P2,
V2 and θ2
Proof: Let us assume Node 2 tried to falsify P2, V2 and θ2. To represent the corrupt
values, this work will consider P as the entity of exchange.
∗ ∼ P = True; Generation reading reported is not normal
∗ IDGI1,DGI2 (P); Node 1 gets generation values from node 2
∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,DGI2 (P); Node 1 believes reading from Node 2
∗ TDGI1,DGI2 (P); Node 1 trusts Node 2
∗ IDGI3,DGI2 (P); Node 3 gets generation values from Node 2
∗ BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI2 (P); Node 3 believes reading from Node 2
∗ TDGI3,DGI1 (P); Node 3 trusts Node 2
∗ Considering Node 2 tries to falsify P2, V2 and θ2 invariants Ia and Ic will be
violated
∗ IDGI1,Ia (Invarianta); Node 1 gets the invariant Ia from SD
Ia
∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,Ia (Invarianta); Node 1 believes the reading from SD
Ia
∗ TDGI1,Ia (Invarianta); Node 1 trusts the reading from SD
Ia
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∗ IDGI1,Ic (Invariantc); Node 1 gets the invariant Ic from SD
Ic
∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,Ic (Invariantc); Node 1 believes the reading from SD
Ic
∗ TDGI1,Ic (Invariantc); Node 1 trusts the reading from SD
Ic
∗ [BDGI1 IDGI1,DGI2 (P) ∧ TDGI1,DGI2 (P)]
∧ [BDGI1 IDGI1,Ia (Invarianta) ∧ TDGI1,Ia (Invarianta)]
∧ [BDGI1 IDGI1,Ic (Invariantc) ∧ TDGI1,Ic (Invariantc)] →∼ BDGI1 (P); Node 1
does not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
∗ w  vDGI1P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 1 DGI
∗ IDGI3,Ia (Invarianta); Node 3 gets the invariant Ia from SD
Ia
∗ BDGI3 IDGI3,Ia (Invarianta); Node 3 believes the reading from SD
Ia
∗ TDGI3,Ia (Invarianta); Node 3 trusts the reading from SD
Ia
∗ IDGI3,Ic (Invariantc); Node 3 gets the invariant Ic from SD
Ic
∗ BDGI3 IDGI3,Ic (Invariantc); Node 3 believes the reading from SD
Ic
∗ TDGI3,Ic (Invariantc); Node 3 trusts the reading from SD
Ic
∗ [BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI2 (P) ∧ TDGI3,DGI2 (P)]
∧ [BDGI3 IDGI3,Ia (Invarianta) ∧ TDGI3,Ia (Invarianta)]
∧ [BDGI3 IDGI3,Ic (Invariantc) ∧ TDGI3,Ic (Invariantc)] →∼ BDGI3 (P); Node 3
does not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
∗ w  vDGI3P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 3 DGI
MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[




MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
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Theorem 4.3.1.6. The system is MSDND secure when Node 2 tries to falsify P2
Proof: Let us assume Node 2 tries to falsify P2. To represent the corrupt values, this
work will consider P as the entity of exchange.
∗ ∼ P = True; Generation reading reported is not normal
∗ IDGI1,DGI2 (P); Node 1 gets generation values from node 2
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∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,DGI2 (P); Node 1 believes reading from Node 2
∗ TDGI1,DGI2 (P); Node 1 trusts Node 2
∗ IDGI3,DGI2 (P); Node 3 gets generation values from Node 2
∗ BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI2 (P); Node 3 believes reading from Node 2
∗ TDGI3,DGI2 (P); Node 3 trusts Node 2
∗ Considering Node 2 tries to falsify P2 invariant Ib will be violated
∗ IDGI1,Ib (Invariantb); Node 1 gets the invariant Ib from SD
Ib
∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,Ib (Invariantb); Node 1 believes the reading from SD
Ib
∗ TDGI1,Ib (Invariantb); Node 1 trusts the reading from SD
Ib
∗ [BDGI1 IDGI1,DGI2 (P) ∧ TDGI1,DGI2 (P)]
∧ [BDGI1 IDGI1,Ib (Invariantb) ∧ TDGI1,Ib (Invariantb)] →∼ BDGI1 (P); Node 1
does not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
∗ w  vDGI1P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 1 DGI
∗ IDGI3,Ib (Invariantb); Node 3 gets the invariant Ib from SD
Ib
∗ BDGI3 IDGI3,Ib (Invariantb); Node 3 believes the reading from SD
Ib
∗ TDGI3,Ib (Invariantb); Node 3 trusts the reading from SD
Ib
∗ [BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI2 (P) ∧ TDGI3,DGI2 (P)]
∧ [BDGI3 IDGI3,Ib (Invariantb) ∧ TDGI3,Ib (Invariantb)] →∼ BDGI3 (P); Node 3
does not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
∗ w  vDGI3P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 3 DGI
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[
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Figure 4.16. Node 3 acting as malicious node in a 3 Node system
Remark: Here it is worth noting that though security domains 10 and security
domains 4 do have a valuation function to identify that there is something wrong with
the system, it is not possible to identify the origin of attack. The invariant Ib can be
affected both by falsifying P1, V1 and θ1 by Node 1 or by falsifying P2 by Node 2.
Hence, in a 3 node system it is impossible to identify which of the two nodes falsified
values for invariant to report the problem in system.
– Considering Node 3 as the malicious node Figure 4.16: Assuming node 3 tries to
falsify its values, a list of impacted invariants is as below:
∗ Falsifying P3 will lead to an invariant Ic violation at point of common coupling c.
∗ FalsifyingV3 and θ3 will lead to an invariant Ib and Ic violation at point of common
coupling b and c respectively.
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∗ Falsifying P3, V3 and θ3 will lead to invariant Ib violation at point of common
coupling b.
Theorem 4.3.1.7. The system is not MSDND secure when Node 3 tries to falsify V3
and θ3
Proof: Let us assume Node 3 tried to falsify V3 and θ3. To represent the corrupt values,
this work will consider P as the entity of exchange.
∗ ∼ P = True; Generation reading reported is not normal
∗ IDGI1,DGI3 (P); Node 1 gets generation values from node 3
∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,DGI3 (P); Node 1 believes reading from Node 3
∗ TDGI1,DGI3 (P); Node 1 trusts node 3
∗ IDGI2,DGI3 (P); Node 2 gets generation values from node 3
∗ BDGI3 IDGI2,DGI3 (P); Node 2 believes reading from node 3
∗ TDGI2,DGI3 (P); Node 2 trusts Node 3
∗ Considering Node 3 tries to falsify V3 and θ3 invariants Ib and Ic will be violated
∗ IDGI1,Ib (Invariantb); Node 1 gets the invariant Ib from SD
Ib
∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,Ib (Invariantb); Node 1 believes the reading from SD
Ib
∗ TDGI1,Ib (Invariantb); Node 1 trusts the reading from SD
Ib
∗ IDGI1,Ic (Invariantc); Node 1 gets the invariant Ic from SD
Ic
∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,Ic (Invariantc); Node 1 believes the reading from SD
Ic
∗ TDGI1,Ic (Invariantc); Node 1 trusts the reading from SD
Ic
∗ [BDGI1 IDGI1,DGI3 (P) ∧ TDGI1,DGI3 (P)]
∧ [BDGI1 IDGI1,Ib (Invariantb) ∧ TDGI1,Ib (Invariantb)]
∧ [BDGI1 IDGI1,Ic (Invariantc) ∧ TDGI1,Ic (Invariantc)] →∼ BDGI1 (P); Node 1
does not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
∗ w  vDGI1P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 1 DGI
∗ IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 gets the invariant Ib from SD
Ib
∗ BDGI2 IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 believes the reading from SD
Ib
∗ TDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 trusts the reading from SD
Ib
∗ IDGI2,Ic (Invariantc); Node 2 gets the invariant Ic from SD
Ic
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∗ BDGI2 IDGI2,Ic (Invariantc); Node 2 believes the reading from SD
Ic
∗ TDGI2,Ic (Invariantc); Node 2 trusts the reading from SD
Ic
∗ [BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI3 (P) ∧ TDGI2,DGI3 (P)]
∧ [BDGI2 IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb) ∧ TDGI2,Ib (Invariantb)]
∧ [BDGI2 IDGI2,Ic (Invariantc) ∧ TDGI2,Ic (Invariantc)] →∼ BDGI2 (P); Node 2
does not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
∗ w  vDGI2P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 2 DGI
MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[




MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
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Theorem 4.3.1.8. The system is MSDND secure when Node 3 tries to falsify P3, V3
and θ3
Proof: Let us assume Node 3 tried to falsify P3, V3 and θ3. To represent the corrupt
values, this work will consider P as the entity of exchange.
∗ ∼ P = True; Generation reading reported is not normal
∗ IDGI1,DGI3 (P); Node 1 gets generation values from node 3
∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,DGI3 (P); Node 1 believes reading from Node 3
∗ TDGI1,DGI3 (P); Node 1 trusts Node 3
∗ IDGI2,DGI3 (P); Node 2 gets generation values from Node 3
∗ BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI3 (P); Node 2 believes reading from Node 3
∗ TDGI2,DGI3 (P); Node 2 trusts Node 3
∗ Considering Node 3 tries to falsify P3, V3 and θ3 invariant Ib will be violated
∗ IDGI1,Ib (Invariantb); Node 1 gets the invariant Ia from SD
Ib
∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,Ib (Invariantb); Node 1 believes the reading from SD
Ib
∗ TDGI1,Ib (Invariantb); Node 1 trusts the reading from SD
Ib
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∗ [BDGI1 IDGI1,DGI3 (P) ∧ TDGI1,DGI3 (P)]
∧ [BDGI1 IDGI1,Ib (Invariantb) ∧ TDGI1,Ib (Invariantb)] →∼ BDGI1 (P); Node 1
does not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
∗ w  VDGI1P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 1 DGI
∗ IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 gets the invariant Ib from SD
Ib
∗ BDGI2 IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 believes the reading from SD
Ib
∗ TDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 trusts the reading from SD
Ib
∗ [BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI3 (P) ∧ TDGI2,DGI3 (P)]
∧ [BDGI2 IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb) ∧ TDGI2,Ib (Invariantb)] →∼ BDGI2 (P); Node 2
does not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
∗ w  vDGI2P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 2 DGI
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[





w  (@ vDGI
1




MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[





w  (@ vDGI
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Remark: Here it is worth noting that though security domains 3 and security domains
4 do have a valuation function to identify that there is something wrong with the
system, however, it is not possible to identify the origin of attack. The invariant Ib can
be affected both by falsifying any of P1, V1 and θ1 by node 1, P2 by Node 2 or P3, V3
and θ3 by node 3. Hence, in a 3 node system it is impossible to identify which of the
two nodes falsified values for invariant to report the problem in system.
Theorem 4.3.1.9. The system is not MSDND secure when Node 3 tries to falsify P3
Proof: Let us assume Node 3 tried to falsify P3. To represent the corrupt values, this
work will consider P as the entity of exchange.
∗ ∼ P = True; Generation reading reported is not normal
58
∗ IDGI1,DGI3 (P); Node 1 gets generation values from node 3
∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,DGI3 (P); Node 1 believes reading from Node 3
∗ TDGI1,DGI3 (P); Node 1 trusts Node 3
∗ IDGI2,DGI3 (P); Node 2 gets generation values from node 3
∗ BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI3 (P); Node 2 believes reading from node 3
∗ TDGI2,DGI3 (P); Node 2 trusts node 3
∗ Considering Node 3 tries to falsify P3 invariant Ic will be violated
∗ IDGI1,Ic (Invariantc); Node 1 gets the invariant Ic from SD9
∗ BDGI1 IDGI1,Ic (Invariantc); Node 1 believes the reading from SD9
∗ TDGI1,Ic (Invariantc); Node 1 trusts the reading from SD9
∗ [BDGI1 IDGI1,DGI3 (P) ∧ TDGI1,DGI3 (P)]
∧ [BDGI1 IDGI1,Ic (Invariantc) ∧ TDGI1,Ic (Invariantc)] →∼ BDGI1 (P); Node 1
does not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
∗ w  vDGI1P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 1 DGI
∗ IDGI2,Ic (Invariantc); Node 2 gets the invariant Ic from SD9
∗ BDGI2 IDGI2,Ic (Invariantc); Node 2 believes the invariant from SD9
∗ TDGI2,Ic (Invariantc); Node 2 trusts the reading from SD9
∗ [BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI3 (P) ∧ TDGI2,DGI3 (P)]
∧ [BDGI2 IDGI2,Ic (Invariantc) ∧ TDGI2,Ic (Invariantc)] →∼ BDGI2 (P); Node 2
does not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
∗ w  vDGI2P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 2 DGI
MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[




MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[




– Outcome: Physical attestation of a 3 node FREEDM system is able to identify an attack
over the system, however, fails to identify the attacker. This motivates us to formulate
the physical attestation protocol over a 7 node system. Over the next section this
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Table 4.2. 3 Node System - Invariant Violations
Malicious Node Falsified Parameter Invariant Violation Comment
1 P1 Ia
identity of attacker
MSDND with respect to1 V1, θ1 Ia, Ib
1 P1, V1, θ1 Ib
2 P2 Ib
identity of attacker
MSDND with respect to2 V2, θ2 Ia, Ib, Ic
2 P2, V2, θ2 Ic
3 P3 Ic
identity of attacker
MSDND with respect to3 V3, θ3 Ib, Ic, Id
3 P3, V3, θ3 Ib, Id
thesis will implement physical attestation protocol over a 7 node system and formulate
parameter violation patters. The analysis will show us the parameter violation over a 7
node system has a unique pattern, considering which an approach can be designed to
identify attacker in the system employing physical attestation. The choice of a 7 node
system is also dependent over the fact that for a Byzantine consensus formulation with
2 malicious nodes, a total of 7 nodes in the system is required. Hence, a 7 node system
can be considered as an intersection of Byzantine consensus and physical attestation in
Cyber Physical Systems.
4.3.2. Physical Attestation of Cyber Process in a 7 Node FREEDM System.
Understanding architecture of 7 node FREEDM system Please consider the Figure 4.17 as
power flow architecture:
The law of conservation of energy states that at points a, b, c, d, e, f and g or the
points of common coupling, total energy entering should be equal to the energy leaving


















a b d e f
Figure 4.17. 7 Node System depicting power flows
Ia : Pin + P1 − Pab = 0
Ib : Pab + P2 − Pbc = 0
Ic : Pbc + P3 − Pcd = 0
Ia : Pcd + P4 − Pde = 0
Ib : Pde + P5 − Pe f = 0
Ic : Pe f + P6 − P f g = 0
Ic : P f g + P7 − Pout = 0
• MSDND analysis of physical attestation protocol over a 7 node FREEDM system To
verify if the system is MSDND secure in a seven node system this work will consider one
node at a time and the parameter values they could falsify to affect the system. Below is










Rather than going forMSDNDanalysis considering each node trying to falsify parameters,
this work will analyze one node pattern which will have unique invariant violations. The
thesis demonstrates below a detailed summary of the parameter violations and subsequent
invariant violations.
Theorem 4.3.2.1. The 7 node system is MSDND secure when nodes 1 through 3 and 5
through 7 try to falsify associated parameters
Proof: As shown in the above table, when nodes other than node 4 try to falsify associated
parameters, the invariant violation matches one of the other node parameter falsification.
The MSDND proof of such a scenario matches any of the MSDND analysis from 3 node
system. The MSDND analysis helps us to identify that there is something wrong for the
system, however, it is not possible to identify the attacker in the system. As an example
this work will consider MSDND of node 1. This work assumes node 1 tries to falsify its
values and see what all invariants will be violated. A list of impacts over the invariants
as below:
1MSDND with respect to identity of attacker exists when the security domains are able to identify there is
something wrong in the system, however, are unable to narrow down to the causing entity. It is worth noting
here that in such a situation peer nodes can narrow down to a group of malicious nodes based over the type of
invariants violated. For Example: In a case where node 1 tries to falsify P1, V1, θ1, sober nodes can narrow
down to a group of nodes N1 or N2 based over the invariant violated, as the probable malicious nodes.
62
Table 4.3. 7 Node System - Invariant Violations
Malicious Node Falsified Parameter Invariant Violation Comment1
1 P1 Ia
identity of attacker
MSDND with respect to
1 V1, θ1 Ia, Ib
1 P1, V1, θ1 Ib
2 P2 Ib
identity of attacker
MSDND with respect to
2 V2, θ2 Ia, Ib, Ic
2 P2, V2, θ2 Ic
3 P3 Ic
identity of attacker
MSDND with respect to
3 V3, θ3 Ib, Ic, Id




4 V4, θ4 Ic, Id , Ie
4 P4, V4, θ4 Ic, Ie
5 P5 Ie
identity of attacker
MSDND with respect to
5 V5, θ5 Id , Ie, I f
5 P5, V5, θ5 Id , I f
6 P6 I f
identity of attacker
MSDND with respect to
6 V6, θ6 Ie, I f , Ig
6 P6, V6, θ6 Ie
7 P7 Ig
identity of attacker
MSDND with respect to
7 V7, θ7 I f , Ig





N4 N5 N6 N7
P1 P4 P5 P6 P7





























































Figure 4.18. Node 1 acting as malicious node in a 7 Node system
– Falsifying P1 will lead to an invariant Ia violation at point of common coupling a.
– Falsifying V1 and θ1 will lead to an invariant Ia, Ib violation at point of common
coupling a and b respectively.
– Falsifying P1, V1 and θ1 will lead to an invariant Ia violation at points of common
coupling a and b.
The system is not MSDND secure when Node 1 tries to falsify V1 and θ1
Proof: Let us assume Node 1 tried to falsify V1 and θ1. To represent the corrupt values,
this work will consider P as the entity of exchange.
– ∼ P = True; Generation reading reported is not normal
– IDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 gets generation values from node 1
– BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 believes reading from node 1
– TDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 trusts Node 1
– Considering Node 1 tries to falsify V1 and θ1
– IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 gets the invariant Ib from SDIb
– BDGI2 IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 believes the reading from SDIb
– TDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 trusts the reading from SDIb
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– IDGI2,Ia (Invarianta); Node 2 gets the invariant Ia from SDIa
– BDGI2 IDGI2,Ia (Invarianta); Node 2 believes the reading from SDIa
– TDGI2,Ia (Invarianta); Node 2 trusts the reading from SDIa
– [BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (P) ∧ TDGI2,DGI1 (P)]
∧ [BDGI2 IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb) ∧ TDGI2,Ib (Invariantb)]
∧ [BDGI2 IDGI2,Ia (Invarianta)∧TDGI2,Ia (Invarianta)]→∼ BDGI2 (P);Node 2 does
not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
– w  vDGI2P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 2 DGI
MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[




The system is MSDND secure when Node 1 tries to falsify P1, V1 and θ1
Proof: Let us assume Node 1 tried to falsify P1, V1 and θ1. To represent the corrupt
values, this work will consider P as the entity of exchange.
– ∼ P = True; Generation reading reported is not normal
– IDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 gets generation values from node 1
– BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 believes reading from node 1
– TDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 trusts Node 1
– Considering Node 1 tries to falsify P1, V1 and θ1
– The invariant Ib = Pab + P2 − Pbc = 0 should be violated and, falsifying P1, V1 and
θ1 violates the invariant.
– IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 gets the invariant Ib from SDIb
– BDGI2 IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 believes the reading from SDIb
– TDGI2,Ib (Invariantb); Node 2 trusts the reading from SDIb
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– [BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (P) ∧ TDGI2,DGI1 (P)]
∧ [BDGI2 IDGI2,Ib (Invariantb)∧TDGI2,Ib (Invariantb)]→∼ BDGI2 (P);Node 2 does
not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
– w  vDGI2P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 2 DGI to
identify that generation values reported are corrupt.
– w  vDGI2Ni = False; Valuation function does not exist in security domain for node
2 DGI to identify which node reported corrupt generation values.
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[





w  (@ vDGI
2




Remark: Here, the above case of invariants violation leads to MSDND secure system.
From the above equation, it can be clearly demonstrated that the security domain 4 has
a valuation function to identify if something wrong is going on in the system, however,
it is not possible to identify the origin of the attack. The invariant Ib can be affected by
falsifying either of the P1, V1 and θ1 by node 1 or P2 by node 2. Hence, in a 3 node system
it is impossible to identify which of the two nodes falsified values for invariant to report
the problem in system.
The system is not MSDND secure when Node 1 tries to falsify P1
Proof: Let us assume Node 1 tried to falsify P1. To represent the corrupt values, this
work will consider P as the entity of exchange.
– ∼ P = True; Generation reading reported is not normal
– IDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 gets generation values from node 1
– BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 believes reading from node 1
– TDGI2,DGI1 (P); Node 2 trusts Node 1
– Considering Node 1 tries to falsify P1
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– The invariant Ia = Pin + P1 − Pab = 0 should be violated and, falsifying P1 violates
the invariant.
– IDGI2,Ia (Invarianta); Node 2 gets the invariant Ia from SDIa
– BDGI2 IDGI2,Ia (Invarianta); Node 2 believes the reading from SDIa
– TDGI2,Ia (Invarianta); Node 2 trusts the reading from SDIa
– [BDGI2 IDGI2,DGI1 (P) ∧ TDGI2,DGI1 (P)]
∧ [BDGI2 IDGI2,Ia (Invarianta)∧TDGI2,Ia (Invarianta)]→∼ BDGI2 (P);Node 2 does
not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
– w  vDGI2P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 2 DGI
MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[




Theorem 4.3.2.2. The 7 node system is not MSDND secure when node 4 tries to falsify
associated parameters
Proof: This work assumes node 4 tries to falsify its values and see what all invariants




































































Figure 4.19. Node 4 acting as malicious node in a 7 Node system
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– Falsifying P4 will lead to an invariant Id violation at point of common coupling d.
– Falsifying V4 and θ4 will lead to an invariant Ic, Id and Ie violation at point of
common coupling c, d and e respectively.
– Falsifying P4, V4 and θ4 will lead to an invariant Ic and Ie violation at points of
common coupling c and e.
The system is not MSDND secure when Node 4 tries to falsify V4 and θ4
Proof: Let us assume Node 1 tried to falsify V1 and θ1. To represent the corrupt values,
this work will consider P as the entity of exchange.
– ∼ P = True; Generation reading reported is not normal
– IDGI3,DGI4 (P); Node 3 gets generation values from node 4
– BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI4 (P); Node 3 believes reading from node 4
– TDGI3,DGI4 (P); Node 3 trusts Node 4
– IDGI5,DGI4 (P); Node 5 gets generation values from node 4
– BDGI5 IDGI5,DGI4 (P); Node 5 believes reading from node 4
– TDGI5,DGI4 (P); Node 5 trusts Node 4
– Considering Node 4 tries to falsify V4 and θ4, invariants Ic, Id and Ie will be violated
– IDGI3,Ic (Invariantc); Node 3 gets the invariant Ic from SD9
– BDGI3 IDGI3,Ic (Invariantc); Node 3 believes the reading from SD9
– TDGI3,Ic (Invariantc); Node 3 trusts the reading from SD9
– IDGI3,Id (Invariantd); Node 3 gets the invariant Id from SD13
– BDGI3 IDGI3,Id (Invariantd); Node 3 believes the reading from SD13
– TDGI3,Id (Invariantd); Node 3 trusts the reading from SD13
– IDGI3,Ie (Invariante); Node 3 gets the invariant Ie from SD17
– BDGI3 IDGI3,Ie (Invariante); Node 3 believes the reading from SD17
– TDGI3,Ie (Invariante); Node 3 trusts the reading from SD17
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– [BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI4 (P) ∧ TDGI3,DGI4 (P)]
∧ [BDGI3 IDGI3,Ic (Invariantc) ∧ TDGI3,Ic (Invariantc)]
∧ [BDGI3 IDGI3,Id (Invariantd) ∧ TDGI3,Id (Invariantd)]
∧ [BDGI3 IDGI3,Ie (Invariante) ∧TDGI3,Ie (Invariante)]→∼ BDGI3 (P); Node 3 does
not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
– w  vDGI3P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 3 DGI
– IDGI5,Ic (Invariantc); Node 5 gets the invariant Ic from SD9
– BDGI5 IDGI5,Ic (Invariantc); Node 5 believes the reading from SD9
– TDGI5,Ic (Invariantc); Node 5 trusts the reading from SD9
– IDGI5,Id (Invariantd); Node 5 gets the invariant Id from SD13
– BDGI5 IDGI5,Id (Invariantd); Node 5 believes the reading from SD13
– TDGI5,Id (Invariantd); Node 5 trusts the reading from SD13
– IDGI5,Ie (Invariante); Node 5 gets the invariant Ie from SD17
– BDGI5 IDGI5,Ie (Invariante); Node 5 believes the reading from SD17
– TDGI5,Ie (Invariante); Node 5 trusts the reading from SD17
– [BDGI5 IDGI5,DGI4 (P) ∧ TDGI5,DGI4 (P)]
∧ [BDGI5 IDGI5,Ic (Invariantc) ∧ TDGI5,Ic (Invariantc)]
∧ [BDGI5 IDGI5,Id (Invariantd) ∧ TDGI5,Id (Invariantd)]
∧ [BDGI5 IDGI5,Ie (Invariante) ∧TDGI5,Ie (Invariante)]→∼ BDGI5 (P); Node 5 does
not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
– w  vDGI5P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 5 DGI
MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[




MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[





The system is not MSDND secure when Node 4 tries to falsify P4, V4 and θ4
Proof: Let us assume Node 4 tried to falsify P4, V4 and θ4. To represent the corrupt
values, this work will consider P as the entity of exchange.
– ∼ P = True; Generation reading reported is not normal
– IDGI3,DGI4 (P); Node 3 gets generation values from node 4
– BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI4 (P); Node 3 believes reading from node 4
– TDGI3,DGI4 (P); Node 3 trusts Node 4
– IDGI5,DGI4 (P); Node 5 gets generation values from node 4
– BDGI5 IDGI5,DGI4 (P); Node 5 believes reading from node 4
– TDGI5,DGI4 (P); Node 5 trusts Node 4
– Considering Node 4 tries to falsify P4, V4 and θ4, invariants Ic and Ie will be violated
– IDGI3,Ic (Invariantc); Node 3 gets the invariant Ic from SD9
– BDGI3 IDGI3,Ic (Invariantc); Node 3 believes the reading from SD9
– TDGI3,Ic (Invariantc); Node 3 trusts the reading from SD9
– IDGI3,Ie (Invariante); Node 3 gets the invariant Ie from SD17
– BDGI3 IDGI3,Ie (Invariante); Node 3 believes the reading from SD17
– TDGI3,Ie (Invariante); Node 3 trusts the reading from SD17
– [BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI4 (P) ∧ TDGI3,DGI4 (P)]
∧ [BDGI3 IDGI3,Ic (Invariantc) ∧ TDGI3,Ic (Invariantc)]
∧ [BDGI3 IDGI3,Ie (Invariante) ∧TDGI3,Ic (Invariante)]→∼ BDGI3 (P); Node 3 does
not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
– w  vDGI3P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 3 DGI
– IDGI5,Ic (Invariantc); Node 5 gets the invariant Ic from SD9
– BDGI5 IDGI5,Ic (Invariantc); Node 5 believes the reading from SD9
– TDGI5,Ic (Invariantc); Node 5 trusts the reading from SD9
– IDGI5,Ie (Invariante); Node 5 gets the invariant Ie from SD17
– BDGI5 IDGI5,Ie (Invariante); Node 5 believes the reading from SD17
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– TDGI5,Ie (Invariante); Node 5 trusts the reading from SD17
– [BDGI5 IDGI5,DGI4 (P) ∧ TDGI5,DGI4 (P)]
∧ [BDGI5 IDGI5,Ic (Invariantc) ∧ TDGI5,Ic (Invariantc)]
∧ [BDGI5 IDGI5,Ie (Invariante) ∧TDGI5,Ie (Invariante)]→∼ BDGI5 (P); Node 5 does
not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
– W  VDGI5P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 5 DGI
MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[




MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[




The system is not MSDND secure when Node 4 tries to falsify P4
Proof: Let us assume Node 4 tried to falsify P4. To represent the corrupt values, this
work will consider P as the entity of exchange.
– ∼ P = True; Generation reading reported is not normal
– IDGI3,DGI4 (P); Node 3 gets generation values from node 4
– BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI4 (P); Node 3 believes reading from node 4
– TDGI3,DGI4 (P); Node 3 trusts Node 4
– IDGI5,DGI4 (P); Node 5 gets generation values from node 4
– BDGI5 IDGI5,DGI4 (P); Node 5 believes reading from node 4
– TDGI5,DGI4 (P); Node 5 trusts Node 4
– Considering Node 4 tries to falsify V4 and θ4, invariant Id will be violated
– IDGI3,Id (Invariantd); Node 3 gets the invariant Id from SD13
– BDGI3 IDGI3,Id (Invariantd); Node 3 believes the reading from SD13
– TDGI3,I4d (Invariantd); Node 3 trusts the reading from SD13
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– [BDGI3 IDGI3,DGI4 (P) ∧ TDGI3,DGI4 (P)]
∧ [BDGI3 IDGI3,Id (Invariantd)∧TDGI3,Id (Invariantd)]→∼ BDGI3 (P);Node 3 does
not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
– W  VDGI3P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 3 DGI
– IDGI5,Id (Invariantd); Node 5 gets the invariant Id from SD13
– BDGI5 IDGI5,Id (Invariantd); Node 5 believes the reading from SD13
– TDGI5,Id (Invariantd); Node 5 trusts the reading from SD13
– [BDGI5 IDGI5,DGI4 (P) ∧ TDGI5,DGI4 (P)]
∧ [BDGI5 IDGI5,Id (Invariantd)∧TDGI5,Id (Invariantd)]→∼ BDGI5 (P);Node 5 does
not believe the reading based over the invariant violations
– w  vDGI5P = True; Valuation function exists in security domain for node 5 DGI
MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[




MSDND(ES) , ∃w ∈ W ` [(SP ⊕ S∼P)] ∧
[






5.1. DISTRIBUTED CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
In a cyber physical system, that is distributed in nature, an important characteristic
is communication among the distributed components. The message flow among these
components is the basis or a primary requirement for the system to function correctly. This
message communication can also be considered as the information flow. To protect the
functioning of a cyber physical system it is important to protect this information flow or
verify the information flowing through it.
5.2. MSDND
Multiple security domain non-deducibility helps us to segregate a cyber physical
system into separate components, where the different components do not trust over the
information supplied by one another. The concept of security domains, valuation functions
and invariants introduced by MSDND provides us the ways in which information flows
can be verified and checked among different components. The invariants help us adding
in multiple paths for similar information to flow from one component to another, thereby
making it more difficult for an attacker to attack the system and go unnoticed.
5.3. STATE COLLECTION PROTOCOL IN THE FREEDM SYSTEM
This work takes the FREEDM system as a target cyber physical system and identifies
MSDNDsecure paths in the information flowing through the system.The state collection pro-
tocol produces information flow, which is based over Chandy Lamport distributed snapshot
algorithm. MSDND analysis over the state collection protocol shows that the information
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flow paths are MSDND secure in the presence of a STUXNET-like attack. The thesis
breaks the MSDND secure information flow using Byzantine consensus solution, however,
a further sophisticated attack sharing similar falsified values to distributed components is
still able to hide the attack.
5.4. MSDND ANALYSIS OF THE PHYSICAL ATTESTATION PROTOCOL
MSDND analysis of the physical attestation protocol helps to introduce deducibility
in the FREEDM system. This work uses a physical attestation protocol over a 3 node and
a 7 node system. In a 3 node system the protocol is unable to identify the origin of the
attack, however, it is able to identify that something is wrong with the system and narrows it
down to a group of nodes that may be causing the problem. Extending the case to a 7 node
system, physical attestation gives us a unique pattern of invariant violations that is able to
narrow down to the malicious node. The same is still restrictive in implementation as a
unique pattern of invariant violations has a specific requirement to be present in between 3
nodes on the either side.
5.5. SUMMARY
The MSDNDmodel helps us to identify STUXNET-like attacks where the intention
of the attacker is to corrupt the information rather than steal it. Using theMSDNDmodel this
work is able to analyzeMSDND secure paths inside the FREEDM smart grid infrastructure.
MSDND secure paths are bad for the system, as different components in the system are
unable to verify the information being passed to them by other components. This work also
uses the MSDND model along with the invariants provided by physical attestation protocol
to break the MSDND secure paths. A summary of the MSDND analysis for different
information paths is represented in Table 5.1
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Table 5.1. MSDND analysis results
Theorem Attack type MSDND
DGI - Device interaction Normal operations No
STUXNET-like Yes
DGI - DGI interaction Normal operations No
STUXNET-like Yes
with Byzantine consensus
DGI - DGI interaction falsified status to different nodes
STUXNET-like sharing different
No
falsified status to different nodes
STUXNET-like sharing similar
Yes
a 3 node system
Physical attestation in
STUXNET-like identity of attacker
MSDND with respect to
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